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AMY RUTH ITA*
Allocation of government funding for art is not a new phenomenon.
Unfortunately, the withdrawal of art funding and refusal to renew art funding
also are not unique. Generally, the withdrawal of and refusal to renew
government funds used for art purposes are constitutional. However, when a
government actor seeks to withdraw or to refuse to renew funding for art
because he or she believes the art will offend a community's values, the
government actor performs an unconstitutional act under the First Amendment.
Effectively, the government actor withdrawing or refusing to renew art funds
censors the art because ofperceived offense to the community's values. The use
of censorial community values both to withdraw funding after an immediate
perception of offense to the community and to refuse to renew funding later is
unconstitutional when the government seeks "to encourage a diversity ofviews. "
This note begins by coining and defining "censorial community values" and
discusses why the use of censorial community values is unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination The note continues by providing recent examples of a
government actor's use of censorial community values. Next, this note examines
the use of censorial community values under several key First Amendment cases.
The author argues that the use of censorial community values by a government
actor immediately to withdraw and later to refuse to renew art funding is
unconstitutional. Finally, the author provides a test courts may use to recognize
a government actor's use of censorial community values.
I. NTODUCTION
On September 28, 1999, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani announced the cancellation
of taxpayer money used to fund the Brooklyn Museum of Art.1 This cancellation
of funds was in response to the museum's decision to show the Sensation
* I would like to thank Professor David Goldberger for his insightful comments,
willingness to review this note, and suggestions on the coining of the term "censorial
community values." My gratitude also extends to J. Banning Jasuinas and Andrew D.M. Miller
for reading and commenting on versions of this note and Elizabeth Schwarz for her impeccable
editorial skills. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Gail Kern Paster for encouraging me to
refine the skills and tools necessary to think critically and to take risks in doing so. This note is
dedicated to my family and friends for their inspiration, support, and humor.
1 Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also David Bar,'ow, Brooklyn Museum Sues to Keep Mayor from
Freezing Its Funds, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1999, at Al (stating that city officials cancelled the
next scheduled payment of $497,554). The Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences is the
formal name of the Brooklyn Museum of Art. See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences, 64 F.
Supp. 2d at 187.
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Exhibit.2 The Sensation Exhibit included a painting by Chris Ofili,3 entitled "The
Holy Virgin Mary," which showed the Virgin Mary with a clump of elephant
dung on one breast.4 Mayor Giuliani stated that "taxpayer dollars should not 'be
used to support the desecration of important national or religious symbol [sic], of
any religion."' 5 Thus, he attempted to use the values of his community, and the
possible offense to people who shared those values, to cancel flunds the museum
received from the city.
Mayor Giuliani's actions were not unique. The use of community values to
justify the cancellation of art funds, or access to art is not a new phenomenon.
For many years, officials have attempted to cancel art funding or access to art
after granting such funding or access because of offense to community values 6
The problem with this phenomenon is that there is no direct case law stating
whether the use of community values to cancel funding for or access to art after
either has been granted is constitutional.7
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... 8 This note will
address the need for a rule to deal with censorial community values,9 and will
urge that the use of censorial community values is blatant viewpoint
discrimination, 10 and therefore a violation of the First Amendment. For the
purposes of this note, censorial community values will be defined as community
values that are used to censor by withdrawing funds for, or access to, art the
community finds offensive or against its values. This note will deal only with the
use of community values to censor art after a government actor has granted
funding or access in two contexts. First, this note will address the use of censorial
2 Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191. The Sensation Exhibit
included approximately ninety works of nearly forty contemporary British artists. Id
3 Among several other artists featured in the exhibit, Chris Ofili received the Turner
Award from the Tate Gallery. Id
4 Barstow, supra note 1, at Al.
5 Brooklyn lnst. ofArts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191; see also Barstow, supra note
1, at Al ("The Mayor has described the painting by Mr. Ofili, who is a Roman Catholic, as
Catholic-bashing.").
6 See infra Part II.C; see, e.g., Sefickv. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644,649 n.14, 650-
51 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that a city official based her revocation of permission to show a
sculpture on the alleged inappropriate and offensive content of the sculpture); Contemporary
Arts Ctr. v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743, 744-45 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (issuing a preliminary injunction
enjoining city officials from interfering with the Mapplethorpe Exhibit while the plaintiff art
museum was charged with "pandering obscenity and the illegal use of minors in nudity oriented
material").
7 See infra Part III.
8 U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
9 See infra Part lI.A (defining censorial community values).
10 See infra Part lI.B (discussing viewpoint discrimination).
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community values immediately after art deemed offensive to the community is
shown. Second, this note will address the constitutionality of using of censorial
community values to deny funding that is typically renewed. This note will not
address whether the use of community values is constitutional when used to
decide initially whether to grant funds or access.1 I
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed whether
censorial community values are constitutional. However, the Supreme Court
recently allowed community values to be used in deciding whether to award
funds.12 The Supreme Court upheld the ability of the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA) to consider "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public."'13 The Supreme Court, however, also
ruled that when the government is not speaking but spending "funds to encourage
a diversity of views from private speakers," it may not use viewpoint-based
restrictions. 14
This note will urge that because the Court's most recent decision discussing
community values was only a facial challenge to a law requiring the consideration
of community values before the art received funding,' 5 it is necessary to use
several Supreme Court cases to formulate a rule that addresses censorial
community values. Further, this note will show that because the use of censorial
community values inevitably will constitute viewpoint discrimination and the
government's purpose is to withhold ideas from the public, the use of censorial
community values is a violation of the First Amendment both in the context of
immediate withdrawal of funding and in later refusal to renew funding.16 Finally,
this note will conclude by discussing a test that courts may use when dealing with
censorial community values.17
This note will begin by defining censorial community values in Part lI.A and
will discuss censorial community values as viewpoint discrimination in Part II.B.
Next, Part ll.C will provide recent examples of the use of censorial community
values to withdraw arts funding or access after such funding or access was
granted. Part III will formulate a rule and test for addressing censorial community
I The author has serious doubts as to whether the consideration of community values
before funding is granted is constitutional, but this note is limited to the use of community
values in censoring art once funding or access already has been granted.
12 NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 570-71 (1998) (upholding a statute requiring the NEA to
consider decency standards and community values in awarding grants because of the nature of
the grant-making process).
13 ld at 572,(citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(dXl)). Thus, NEA may consider diverse beliefs and
American values in deciding whether or not to award grants. See id at 587; infra Part III.A.
14 Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). See infra Part
11.B.
15 Finley, 524 U.S. at 573.
16 See infra Part III.D.1.
17 See infra Part lI.D.2.
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values by discussing several Supreme Court cases and combining their holdings.
II. CENSORIAL COMMUNITY VALUES
This section defines censorial community values, explains why the use of
censorial community values constitutes viewpoint discrimination, and finally,
provides recent examples of the use of censorial community values. The use of
censorial community values basically consists of a dialogue between the
community and an official who cancels funds or access to art the community will
find offensive. It is important to name and define this dialogue between the
community and a government official because the use of censorial community
values is not a unique phenomenon.' 8 The use of censorial community values
occurs any time an official acts on behalf of the community to cancel art funding
or access out of belief that the community will find the art offensive.
A. Censorial Community Values Defined
Censorial community values are community values used to censor art
deemed offensive by the community or one speaking on behalf of the
community.19 Censorial community values are used to justify the withholding of
funds20 promised or access granted to art or artists.
Censorial community values must be, by definition, censorial. "Censor" is
defined as "to subject to a censor's examination, . . . to alter, delete, or ban
completely after examination." 21 Furthermore, as a person or entity, a censor is a
"supervisor or inspector especially of conduct and morals."22 Thus, community
values used to ban or delete art particularly on the basis of the moral message of
the art, are censorial. That is to say, censorial community values refer to those
values used by a government entity to delete art after that art is deemed offensive
18 See infra Part II.C; see also supra note 6.
19 The author recognizes that art is not the only form of speech subjected to censorship by
community values. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (addressing a student council's denial of printing funds for a religious student
newspaper); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (addressing a challenge to a statute
prohibiting the placement of a burning cross on public or private property); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991) (discussing a federal program providing funds for family planning services
so long as they did not refer patients to or promote doctors performing abortions); Bd. of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (discussing a school board's decision to remove books from a
school library). This note, however, focuses upon the context of arts funding and access, and the
following analysis is structured accordingly.
20 For a discussion of the benefits and dangers of government subsidization of speech, see
Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L.
REv. 543, 560-62 (1996).




to the members of the community.
The withdrawal of funding or access to art injures the art, artist, or art
museum within the definition of censorial. The withdrawal of funds from an artist
or museum that shows the art will force the artist or museum to find other
avenues to seek funding. If the artist or museum is unable to find such funding,
the artist may be forced to discontinue producing art and the museum may be
forced to close or limit its exhibits. Therefore, the withdrawal of funding or access
to particular art is censorial because it may effectively delete or ban the art. While
the act of withdrawing funding does not actually remove the art from a museum's
walls or floors, it can lead to that result. A museum in need of certain funds to
exist may make the decision to remove the art to secure its funds. Thus, the
withdrawal of funding can effectively withdraw and ban the art, thereby
censoring the art.
Community values are broad and may encompass the morals, ethics,
standards of decency, religious values, and political ideologies of a community.
"Community" is defined as "a unified body of individuals[;] ... the people with
common interests living in a particular area."23 "Values" are defined as
"something (as a principle, quality, or entity) intrinsically valuable or desirable." 24
Thus, a community value is something a group of people with common interests
holds valuable. A community value could encompass a particular object such as a
car or could be more abstract such as a particular religious belief. The importance
of the image of the Virgin Mary to Catholics is a community value. Catholics, as
a community, hold the image of the Virgin Mary as a symbol of their beliefs and
value it accordingly.25
Thus, censorial community values are those beliefs, standards, or morals
valued by a group of people with common interests used to ban art through the
withdrawing funding or access to art after a government actor previously granted
such funding or access.
B. Censorial Community Values as Viewpoint Discrimination
The use of censorial community values is viewpoint discrimination 2 6 In
2 3 VEBSTER'sNmNEW COLLEGIATE DICTONARY 267 (9th ed. 1983).
2 4 WEBSTER'S THIRD NENV INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2530 (3d ed.
1987).
25 This is evidenced by Mayor Giuliani's response to the Sensation Exhibit on behalf of
the community. See infra Part II.C.2.
26 This note will not address whether the use of censorial community values constitutes
viewpoint discrimination if a government actor used those values to stop an exhibit from being
shown before the public has the chance to view it. That type of fact scenario might best be
examined under prior restraint case law. For example, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v.
Conrad, the Court found that the directors of the Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium
unconstitutionally restrained a production of "Hair" by rejecting an application to use the
2000] 1729
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Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia the United States Supreme
Court held: "[W]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all
the more blatant.... Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of
content discrimination." 27  Here, the Court illustrates that viewpoint
discrimination is unconstitutional because a government entity targets speech
based on the viewpoint expressed by a speaker 8 Therefore, according to
Rosenberger, if the government entity acts out of disapproval or a community's
disapproval for a particular viewpoint, the government entity discriminates on the
basis of that viewpoint and therefore violates the First Amendment.
Accordingly, the govermment's act to curtail art because of the viewpoint
expressed in that art29 is viewpoint discrimination.30 The government
auditorium for the production. 420 U.S. 546, 547-48, 562 (1975). The Court held the
application process lacked procedural safeguards required by a system of prior restraint. Id at
562. The Court reiterated the required safeguards:
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the material is
unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judicial review can be
imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo.
Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured.
Id at 560. Thus, in order for a government actor to use perceived possible offense to the
community as a justification for curtailing art, the government actor would have to institute
stringent procedural safeguards. This results because the Court views systems of prior restraint
with skepticism. Id at 558 ("Any system of prior restraint, however, 'comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."') (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971);
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S.
175, 181 (1968); Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697,716 (1931))).
27 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,391 (1992)).
2 8 Id ("The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction." (citing
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983))).
29 Some argue that the government's decision to fund some art and to decline to fund
other art poses a major dilemma.
[l]f government cannot fund all artists or all works, how must it choose? If it makes choices, it
must adopt and apply standards. And if those standards are not simply broad and bland
categories-for example, fund only oil paintings but not water colors...--then there is
inevitable potential for content differentiation. The difficulty is deciding when that
differentiation abridges or inhibits freedom of expression in ways the first amendment will not
allow.
Robert M. O'Neil, Artistic Freedom and Academic Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
177, 191 (Summer 1990).
3 0 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("T]he fact that society may
find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional
protection."); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the
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discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it uses censorial community values
to justify the withholding of previously granted funds or access to art. When the
government or an agent of the government withholds funding because the art will
offend the community, the government is targeting the art because of the views
expressed in it. Indeed, in some contexts, viewpoint discrimination may be
justified when the government initially is deciding whether or not to fund an
activity.3 ' In fact, some government funding decisions require the government to
make choices based on viewpoint.32 However, the government may not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when it provides funding to "encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers." 33
Some believe that because the community funds the art through the paying of
taxes, the community has a right to fund art consistent with its values and refuse
to fund art inconsistent with its values.34 Under recent Supreme Court case law,
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"). Furthermore, in determining whether the
government's action is viewpoint discrimination, the court must consider whether the
government acted out of disagreement with the message of the speech. See Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The government's purpose is the controlling
consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others."). In Wara the Court held that a government could regulate expressive activity as long
as that regulation was content neutral and any action taken was done without reference to the
content of the speech. Id
31 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding that it is not viewpoint
discrimination for the government to selectively fund a program when it wishes to encourage
specific activities without being obligated to fund an alternative program which deals with the
problem in a different manner); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 ("[W]hen the State is the speaker,
it may make content-based choices.... [V]hen the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes." (citing Rust, 500 U.S.
at 194).
32 Majorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 110 (1996)
(stating that the government may appropriately favor some speech when it makes decisions
regarding art exhibits, research grants, and tax exemptions). But see Kristine M. Cunnane,
Maintaining Viewpoint Neutraiyfor the NEA: National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 31
CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1472 (Summer 1999) ("Although the NEA is a selective funding
program, selectivity does not justify viewpoint discrimination in supporting private
speech.... [L]imited resources does not allow the government to exercise impermissible
discretion over who should receive funding."); Redish & Kessler, supra note 20, at 568 (stating
that viewpoint-based subsidies are presumptively unconstitutional and dangerous). "If we
permit the government to make viewpoint-based subsidies, the government could choose to
fund only those viewpoints with which it agreed, thereby dramatically skewing public debate
and undermining First Amendment principles." Id
33 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. Furthermore, the government may not justify such
viewpoint discrimination based on a scarcity of funds. Id at 835.
34 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 ("The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
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there is some support for the argument that community values may initially be
used to justify the funding of art 35 However, this discussion does not deal with
the use of censorial community values to grant funds initially. Rather, this
discussion concerns the use of censorial community values involved in the
decision to withdraw funding or access to art after a government entity already
granted such funding or access. It is this use of censorial community values that
constitutes viewpoint discrimination. In addition, the unconstitutional use of
censorial community values can even be present in a refusal to renew funding if a
government actor bases this refusal on past offense to the community's values 6
When a government actor uses censorial community values, the decision to
withdraw funding or access is a direct response to disagreement with the
viewpoint expressed in the art
When a person acting on behalf of the community seeks to withdraw funding
or access to art because of the offense done to the community, that withdrawal
constitutes viewpoint discrimination. In this scenario, the funding or access is
without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem
in another way. In doing so, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it
has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."). Rust specifically dealt
with the provision of government funds for family planning services under Title X of the Public
Health Service Act Id at 179. Congress required that the funds be expended only to support
preventive family planning services that did not promote or refer patients to doctors who
performed abortions. Id at 179-80. Health care providers brought a First Amendment
challenge to the prohibition from engaging in abortion related services. Id at 181, 192. The
Court ruled that "when that Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program." Id at 194.
See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (upholding a state welfare regulation
which allowed Medicaid recipients to receive payments for childbirth services so long as they
were not related to nontherapeutic abortions). 'There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy." Id at 475; J. Sarah Kim, Comment, Defending the
"Decency Clause" in Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 627,647 (1993) ("Although the [congressional] spending power may not be
used to induce recipients to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional,
government spending is not subject to neutrality in deciding which projects to fund." (citing
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987))). The author argued that because the NEA has
a limited budget, it must always promote some art over others. Id at 649. The author further
argued that while the limited budget does not justify invidious discrimination, the consideration
of general standards of decency is constitutional. Id
However, it is important to note that the acts discussed above specifically deal with the
provision of funds prior to any speech or action. The Court ruled that the government does not
have to fund all speech when it is initially deciding whether to provide money. However, Rust,
Maher, and Finley do not address the issue of whether the government may withdraw funds
after the community takes offense to speech the government funded already.
35 See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,586 (1998); see also infra Part liA.36 See infra Part IV.D.1.a for a discussion of the unconstitutionality of using censorial
community values as a basis for refusal to renew funding.
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withdrawn specifically because of the viewpoint expressed in the art. The
viewpoint offended, or had the potential to offend, the community based on the
community's values. Therefore, in retaliation to that offense, a government entity
withdraws the funding or access that enables the art's viewpoint to be expressed
and thereby censors the art. Thus, the use of censorial community values is
always viewpoint discrimination because it is used to curtail a viewpoint on the
basis of that viewpoint
C. Recent Examples of Censorial Community Values
1. Cuban Museum of Arts and Culture, Inc. v. Miami37
In December 1989, the City of Miami informed the Cuban Museum of Arts
and Culture that the city intended to terminate the museum's lease because of the
museum's failure to discontinue the sale of certain artwork.38 The city took these
actions in response to the controversy resulting from the museum's decision to
sell art created by artists who had not renounced the Castro regime or who lived
in communist Cuba.39 In response to the controversy, 40 the Miami City
Commission investigated alleged violations of the city's lease agreement with the
museum and conducted numerous audits of the museum's records.41 Due to the
controversy surrounding the auction, the city decided not to renew the museum's
lease as long as the museum's administration remained the same.42 The museum
then sued the city alleging a violation of the First Amendment and the city began
eviction proceedings. 43 The trial court found that the city commenced its eviction
proceedings as a result of the controversial and unpopular views the museum
advanced.44
37 766 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
38 Id at 1123.
39 Id at 1122. The controversial acts resulting from the auction of the artwork included the
burning of a painting after purchase and the bombing of a car owned by one of the directors of
the museum. Id
40 
"Fhe auction provoked a commotion among Cuban exiles here and divided the
museum's board of directors between those who viewed the artists as representatives of the
Communist leader of Cuba, Fidel Castro, and those who argued for tolerance and artistic
freedom." Mireya Navarro, How Controversial Art Killed a Museum; In a Case that Parallels
'Sensation,' Cultural Leaders Took on Miami, N. Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1999, at B1.
41 Cuban Museum of Arts, 766 F. Supp. at 1123. The commission also investigated
allegations that the museum instituted an admission charge against the city's intent of free
admission. Id
42 Id at 1124.
43 Id
441d at 1129. "[T]he City nonetheless appears to have fallen victim to the local
community's intolerance for those who chose to provide a forum for controversial artists." Id at
20001
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The city attempted to evict the museum through the use of censorial
community values because it used the community's reaction and offense to the art
sold by the museum to censor the art and museum. The trial court specifically
found that the city did not take action against the museum until controversy arose
surrounding the auction.45 The city only began its attempt to evict the museum,
and thereby withdraw a benefit already conferred upon the museum, when the
museum's actions offended the community's values and opinions regarding
communist Cuba.4 6
Therefore, this incident is one example of the use of censorial community
values. The city attempted to censor the museum because of the art auctioned by
the museum, the message of that auctioning, and the values the community
asserted against Cuba. Furthermore, the city's actions constituted blatant
viewpoint discrimination in it attempted to censor the museum because the
community disagreed with the viewpoint connected with the art-the approval, or
appearance of approval, of communist Cuba. The trial court found that the city
would not have attempted to evict the museum if the museum had not exhibited
the controversial works.47
While the city's actions were not based on offense to the content of the art,
offense to community values was still the basis for the city's actions. The
community was offended with the implication of support for communist Cuba
through the auctioning of the art not the actual art. However, the community's
values, strong beliefs against communism, were indeed offended by the
auctioning of the art, and these values induced the city to attempt to censor the art.
Thus, the City of Miami used censorial community values in its attempt to evict
the museum.
1126. "The conduct of the City Commission with respect to the asserted grounds for the denial
of continued possession reveals that the reasons asserted were either minor concerns or a
pretextual basis upon which to remove the Cuban Museum and its present directors." Id at
1127.
45 Id at 1127.
Almost immediately following the controversial exhibition and auction, the City began
looking into virtually every allegation made against the Cuban Museum and its present
directors. The City quickly ordered investigations of the auctions in order to detect a basis for
eviction .... More importantly, however, the court notes that the Commission never exhibited
and real concern over possible self-dealing and auction profits in connection with directors other
than those who had been linked with the controversial art.
Id Thus, the justifications-concem for self-dealing and auction profits--the city advanced in
its attempt to evict the museum were basically a pretext for the real reason the city wanted to





2. Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York48
On October 1, 1999, the Brooklyn Museum of Art filed suit against the City
and Mayor of New York in response to city officials' threats to withhold, and
actual withholding of, the city's monthly payment of $497,554 to the museum.49
The city withheld the monthly payment to the museum in response to an art
exhibit50 Mayor Rudolph Giuliani found offensive both to him and the
community.51 Furthermore, the city commenced an ejectment action in state court
stating that the museum had violated its lease 5 2
In issuing an injunction against the city, the trial court discussed the right of
the government not to provide benefits53 and the provisions of the contract and
lease between the city and the museum.54 The trial court found that the lease and
contract between the city and the museum did not allow the mayor to withdraw
funding because of disapproval of an exhibit.55 The trial court specifically
48 64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
49 ld at 191-92. The museum sought declaratory and injunctive relief "to prevent the
defendants from punishing or retaliating against the museum for displaying the Exhibit" Id
50 The art exhibit contained a painting entitled 'The Holy Virgin Mary" by Chris Ofili.
The painting of the Virgin Mary has a clump of elephant dung on one breast. Barstow, supra
note 1, at Al.
51 Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191. In reference to the art
exhibit:
The Mayor stated that this work "offends me?' and "is sick," and he explained his decision to
terminate City funding as follows:
You don't have a right to a government subsidy to desecrate someone else's religion. And
therefore we will do everything that we can to remove funding from the [Museum] until
the director comes to his senses. And realizes that if you are a government subsidized
enterprise then you can't do things that desecrate the most personal and deeply held views
of the people in society.
Id
52 Id. at 192. The city alleged that the museum violated its lease by charging an admission
fee for the exhibit, violating the museum's obligation to educate children because the exhibit
was inappropriate for children, and furthering the commercial interests of private parties as
opposed to public purposes because the owner of the exhibit is a client of a commercial entity
that also provides funds to the museum. Id
53 The trial court stated that this case was not about "requiring the taxpayer to support a
particular point of view" but was about "barring government officials from invidiously
discriminating against ideas they find offensive, either to themselves or to members of the
community." Id at 201.
54 Id at 203-04.
55 Id at 204. The trial court stated,
If [the Museum] now sold its collections and became a pornography museum, the withholding
of operating subsidies and the claims of a lease or contract violation would arise under vastly
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compared the situation to the Miami incident56 and stated that New York's claims
of a lease and contract violation also were pretextual.5 7 The trial court stated that
the city's action to withhold the funding was discrimination aimed at suppressing
ideas with which the city and mayor disagreed.58 Despite the city's early promise
to appeal the injunction, both the museum and the city agreed to drop their
lawsuits and agreed to a settlement.59
Like the incident with the Cuban Museum of Arts and Culture, New York's
actions also constituted the use of censorial community values. The mayor
attempted to censor the art by withdrawing museum funding because of the
offense he took to the exhibit and the offense he believed the community would
take.60 The mayor used the community's religious values61 to justify the
censorship-withholding of funds and ejectment from the museum's premises--
different facts from those presented here. The City and the mayor have not shown that the
funding provided has not been spent for the purposes authorized.
Id.
5 6 See supra Part I.C.1.
57 Brooklyn Inst. ofArts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
5 8 Id. at 200.
The decision to withhold an already appropriated general operating subsidy from an institution
which has been supported by the City for over one hundred years, and to eject it from its City-
owned building, because of the Mayor's objection to certain works in a current exhiit, is, in its
own way, to "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'aim [] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas."'
Id (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)). See
also Cunnane, supra note 32, at 1445 ('The United States government is not required to find
the arts.... When the government chooses to do so, however, it cannot employ a funding
process that constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of... First Amendment
authority.").
5 9 Alan Feuer, Giuliani Dropping His Bitter Battle With Art Museum, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2000, at Al (stating the museum dropped its First Amendment lawsuit and the city
dropped its eviction proceedings). However, despite the settlement the city maintained the
mayor's right to be offended by the exhibit. Id. ("Nonetheless, (Michael 0. Hess, the City's
corporate counsel) said, 'part of that exhibit was obviously religion-bashing, and the mayor
took exception to that, and rightly so.").
60 Evidently, the mayor's perception of the community response was not far from wrong
for some members of the community. The Orthodox Union's president, Mandell Ganchrow,
stated, "'Displaying a religious symbol splattered with dung is deeply offensive and can hardly
be said to have any redeeming social or artistic value .... Today the offense is perpetrated
against a Christian symbol. Tomorrow it might be a Jewish ritual item, and then of another
faith."' Barstow, supra note 1, at Al.
61 "On September 28, the mayor publicly stated that taxpayer dollars should not 'be used
to support the desecration of important national or religious symbol [sic], of any religion.' A
City press release that day denounced 'an exhibit which besmirches religion and is an insult to
the community."' Brooklyn Inst. ofArts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (emphasis added).
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of the museum. The mayor's act was vengeful because he sought to withdraw
funding after the city granted it. Viewpoint discrimination was evident because
the mayor withheld the funding due to his disapproval of the viewpoint expressed
in the exhibit 62 Therefore, the mayor's attempt to withhold funding already
allocated to the museum and thereby force the museum to remove the art because
of an exhibit's offense to the community, was a use of censorial community
values.
3. The Detroit Institute ofArts' Use of Censorial Community Values
On November 19, 1999, the director of the Detroit Institute of Arts withdrew
an exhibit after the exhibit was shown for two days.63 The new director64 of the
museum shut down the exhibit out of concern that it would offend the
community. 65 The spokesperson for the museum stated, "[W]hen the people
inside the museum are questioning [the exhibit], it was time to reconsider... We
had a responsibility to the artist, but a greater one to the community. '66
Unlike the incidents in Miami and New York City, this incident did not
involve a government entity's attempt to withhold funding or access to art.
However, the museum director's act of withholding access was indeed a use of
censorial community values. The director closed the exhibit and censored the art
that the community could find offensive. Like the incidents in Miami and Cuba,
the director's act was viewpoint discrimination-he withdrew the exhibit because
of the viewpoint the exhibit contained. The rule for censorial community values
that will be articulated in Parts HI.D and C will specifically deal with the
government's use of censorial community values. However, the Detroit Institute
of Arts' use of censorial community values demonstrates that private actors such
as museum directors also are influenced by community values.
62 The trial court stated that "the Museum, having been allocated a general operating
subsidy, can[not] now be penalized with the loss of that subsidy, and ejectment from a City-
owned building, because of the perceived viewpoint of the works in the Exhibit" Id at 202.
63 Robyn Meredith, Museum Shuts Provocative Exhibit, Igniting Flap, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
23, 1999, at 10.
64 Evidently, the new director was unaware of the contents of the exhibit before the exhibit
opened. See id The exhibit contained "a toy Jesus wearing a condom, a pile of human
excrement and a Brazil nut labeled with a racial epithet." Id
65 Id See also Julia Duin, Museum Pulls Plug on 'Shock Art'Exhibit, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
23, 1999, at A7 ("h[Te director] then issued a press release saying he 'reluctantly' decided to
postpone the exhibit on the grounds it would 'cause offense to important parts of our




1IH. FORMULATING A RULE FOR DEALING WITH CENSORIAL COMMUNITY
VALUES
There is no direct rule or case law for dealing with the use of censorial
community values to withdraw funding for or access to art. The most recent
Supreme Court case in this area seems to advocate the consideration of
community values in the arts context, at least when this consideration is statutorily
mandated.67 Therefore, in order to formulate a rule to apply to the issue of
censorial community values, it is necessary to consider several Supreme Court
cases.
A. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley68
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley found Title 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)69
facially valid.70 Section 954(d) required the NEA to consider, among other things,
diverse American beliefs and values when it judged the artistic merit of grant
applications. 7 1 The Court reasoned that § 954(d) did not silence artists72 -and
thereby violate the First Amendment-because it did not "expressly 'threaten
censorship of ideas.' '73 The Court stated that the content-based considerations
required by the statute were already inherent74 in the nature of grant-making to
67 See generally NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
68 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
69 Title 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) provides that the chairperson of the NEA "shall ensure that
.... artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking
into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values
of the American public."' Finley, 524 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).
70 Id at 573.
71 Id at 576.
72 Many authors have argued that the decision in Finley, upholding the ability of the NEA
to consider values of the public, will have a chilling effect upon artists and their work. See
Cunnane, supra note 32, at 1477 ("The chilling effect moves beyond mere government funding
because of the extensive influence that the NEA has on the arts community, in that private
funding of the arts generally follows the NEA's choices." (footnote omitted)); Andrea K.
McKoy, Note, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: First Amendment Free Speech No
Longer Guaranteedfor the Arts, 50 MERCER L. REV. 791, 807 (1999) ("Because the NEA
looks at all of an artist's work, including prior work, in deciding whether to award funding,
artists will be forced to conform work produced with private funds to that which the NEA is
more likely to deem decent and respectful." (footnote omitted)).
73 Finley, 524 U.S. at 583.
74 But see Cunnane, supra note 32, at 1470 (stating that the "clear-cut intent is to 'favor
one speaker over another' by directing NEA funding to art projects that do not express
controversial or offensive messages" (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va, 515 U.S.
819, 835 (1995))). Cunnane provides one example stating, "[A]rt that is 'respectful' of religious
beliefs and values, such as a devotional depiction of the Madonna and Child could be funded,
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art.75 Furthermore, the Court said that in contrast to other areas the government
subsidizes,76 when the government funds art through the National Endowment for
the Arts, it cannot do so to "'encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers."' 77
However, the Court specifically distinguished the facial challenge in Finley
from a potential case that included discrimination in a particular funding
decision.78 The Court stated,
If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective
criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different
case. We have stated that, even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not
"ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas," 79 ... and if a subsidy were
"manipulated" to have a "coercive effect," then relief could be appropriate. 80
Furthermore, the Court stated that "a more pressing constitutional question would
arise if Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate
burden calculated to drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'
81
Thus, in dicta the Court stated that the statutory requirement to consider the
diverse American values in granting funding to art was constitutional on its face
82
whereas a different depiction of the same subject-matter with sexual overtones would be
rejected." Id
75 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 (explaining that "[t]he NEA has limited resources and it
must deny the majority of the grant applications that it receives").
76 The Court distinguished several cases that struck government action curtailing speech
from the art grant-making process. For example, the Court stated that government subsidization
of art through the NEA was unlike the factual scenario in Rosenberger because funding was
available to all student organizations so long as the organizations related to educational
purposes. Id at 586 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824
(1995)). The Court also distinguished cases where a government actor was required to allocate
public benefits objectively such as in granting equal access to a school auditorium or a
municipal theater. Id (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384,386 (1993); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,555 (1975)).
77 1d at 586 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
78 1d at 587. 'Thus, we have no occasion here to address an as-applied challenge in a
situation where the denial of a grant may be shown to be the product of invidious viewpoint
discrimination." Id
79 1d (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550, (1983)).
80 Id (citing Ark. Writers' Project Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
81 Id (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
82 Some have argued that when the government funds art, it must always make a choice
based on the content of that art, thus, content or viewpoint discrimination is not the proper way
to analyze discriminatory government funding. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment:
When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199, 207
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but may not be constitutional if used to discriminate against a particular
viewpoint. The Court also stated in dicta that this viewpoint discrimination could
be evidenced by the use of values as a penalty against disfavored viewpoints, as a
coercive effect to control viewpoints, or as a burden to allow only certain
viewpoints to enter the marketplace of ideas.83 Because the Court found none of
these motivations present, the statute was upheld as constitutional.84
The use of censorial community values directly corresponds to the dicta in
Finley. Because censorial community values are used after a viewpoint expressed
in art is discovered, examined, and deemed offensive, 85 censorial community
values are used to drive a viewpoint from the marketplace. For example, when
New York City's Mayor attempted to censor art by withdrawing funding from the
Brooklyn Museum of Art by showing art that offended people of the Catholic
religion,86 the mayor attempted to drive the art from the marketplace.87 Thus,
because censorial community values were used to ban a piece of artwork and
because they represent viewpoint discrimination, the dicta in Finley would hold
the use of censorial community values unconstitutional.
B. Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia88
In Rosenberger, the Court found unconstitutional the university's
withholding of authorization for payments to outside contractors for the printing
of a religious group's newspaper because of the group's religious affiliation.89
(1994). Here, Chemerinsky stated that the proper inquiry was whether the government ensured
procedural fairness under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id at 211. Chemerinsky
clearly stated, specific, and non-discriminatory criteria for how government choices be made
and the ability of courts to scrutinize government decisions to ensure that the government
properly applied the criteria. Id at 212-13.
83 Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
84Id
85 
'[T he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a
reason for according it constitutional protection."' Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46,55 (1988) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,745-46 (1978)).86 See supra Part Il.C.2.
87 The attempt to drive the art from the marketplace is evidenced by the mayor's
statement, "[W]e will do everything that we can to remove funding from the [Museum] until
the director comes to his senses. And realizes that if you are a government subsidized enterprise
then you can't do things that desecrate the most personal and deeply held views of the people in
society." Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). This statement directly illustrates how the mayor intended to coerce the
museum, by withdrawing funding, into withdrawing the viewpoint expressed in the art.
88 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
89 Id at 821. "When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken
by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more
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The Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied the group's request
to pay for printing specifically because of the group's religious activity.90 The
Court found that the university denied funding based on viewpoint
discrimination.91 The Court stated:
We recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to promote a
particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.... It does not follow,
however,... that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does
not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends
funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.92
The Court found that because the university implemented a program to pay
for printing expenses of student newspapers to encourage a diversity of views,9 3
and then denied such funding to a religious group because of its viewpoint, the
university discriminated against that group and violated the First Amendment.94
Hence, the Court stated that when the government is not the speaker, but
instead is funding private speakers95 to "encourage a diversity of views,"96 it may
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. The holding in Rosenberger is
essential to the analysis of censorial community values in the arts context. When
the government is spending money or providing leased premises for art to
encourage a diversity of views, the government then cannot discriminate against
some of those views. For example, in Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences v.
City of New York the trial court found that the annual final report and budget
request forms required by the city did not require the museum to submit detailed
blatant .... Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination." Id. at
829 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,391 (1992)).
90 Id. at 827.
91 d. at 832.
92 Id. at 833-34 (emphasis added) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,194 (1991)).
93 The Court distinguished between a situation in which the government may discriminate
on the basis of content such as when the discrimination serves the purpose of the forum for the
speech and a situation in which the government discriminates between permissible speech. Id
at 829-30. The Court stated that"viewpoint discrimination... is presumed impermissible when
directed against speech othenvise within the forum's limitations." Id. at 830.
94 Id. at 834-37.
95 Some argue that when the government funds private speakers, the government is in a
good position to manipulate the public. See Redish & Kessler, supra note 20, at 570. Redish &
Kessler state:
When a government officer speaks,... the listener is able to "discount" the expression on the
basis of the speaker's apparent self-interest. However, when government fosters dissemination
of its positions by means of funding private party expression, the danger arises that the public
will fail to "discount" the views expressed.
Id (footnote omitted).96 Rosenberger v. Rector ofthe Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)
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information concerning the art to be shown in the museum. 97 This situation is
different from the Finley case wherein the Court stated that the National
Endowment for the Arts does not seek to encourage a diversity of views 8
Because the city did not require, in the report, the museum to gain the city's
approval of art before exhibiting it, it can be argued that the city provided funding
to the museum to encourage a diversity of views. If the city did not want to
encourage a diversity of views, but instead wanted veto power over the art shown
in the museum, one could assume the city would have required detailed
information on the art at some point in time.
The use of censorial community values in the context of art funding, when
the government wants to encourage a diversity of views, is unconstitutional.
Because the use of censorial community values constitutes viewpoint
discrimination,99 and because the government cannot discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint when encouraging a diversity of views, the use of censorial community
values in the arts context is unconstitutional. Government viewpoint
discrimination and encouragement of a diversity of views are contradictory under
Rosenberger; thus, the government's use of censorial community values to ban
art the community finds offensive violates the rule set forth in Rosenberger.
C. Board of Education v. Pico100
In Pico,101 the Supreme Court considered a school board's action in
removing from the elementary and secondary school libraries books characterized
as 'anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy"'.102 The
school board argued that it had a duty to protect the school children from moral
danger.10 3 Furthermore, the school board argued that "they must be allowed
97 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
98 NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,586 (1998).
99 See supra Part II.B.
100 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
101 For background and discussion on Board of Education v. Pico, see generally Helen M.
Quenemoen, Case Comment, Board of Education v. Pico: The Supreme Court's Answer to
School Library Censorship, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 1103 (1983).102 Pico, 457 U.S. at 857 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y.
1979)); see also Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976)
(stating that a school board could not remove books from a school library based on "the social
or political tastes of school board members."); Right to Read Def. Comm. of Chelsea v. Sch.
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. Mass. 1978) (stating a school board's discretion to
determine what books will go into the school library *s not the same as the discretion to remove
books from the school library).
103 Pico, 457 U.S. at 857. For a discussion of the tension between school board power to
structure school curriculum and student rights to information, see Heins, supra note 32 at 159-
60 ( Before Pico, some courts invalidated school censorship decisions without sharply
distinguishing between content and viewpoint discrimination. Others made the distinction,
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unfettered discretion to 'transmit community values' through the... schools."'1 4
The Pico plurality 0 5 stated:
Thus whether petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied
respondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind
petitioners' actions. If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny
respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the
decisive factor in petitioners' decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion
in violation of the Constitution.10 6
The plurality asserted that a school board does not have the power to remove
books from school libraries because the school board dislikes the ideas expressed
in those books.107 The plurality stated that to do so would 'prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." '108
Thus, in Pico, the plurality stated that the use of censorial community values
in the context of school libraries is unconstitutional if the government's purpose is
to withhold information from school children. This can be analogized to the use
of censorial community values in the context of arts funding and access. Like the
situation in Pico, the City of Miami attempted to withdraw speech from the
community. The two incidents are not identical because in Pico the school board
was accused of seeking to remove the offensive speech by actually removing the
books from the school library.'0 9 In Cuban Museum of Arts, the city attempted to
remove the offensive speech indirectly by evicting the museum.I10 However, in
both cases, the issue was whether the government actor attempted to remove
leaving only a narrow window for First Amendment claims, or appeared to reject judicial
intervention entirely." (footnote omitted)).
104 Pico, 457 U.S. at 869.
105 "Because a majority of justices did not concur in any one opinion, the authority of
Pico is limited.' Quenemoen, supra note 101, at 1113. For a discussion on the precedential
value of the plurality decision in Pico, see id at 1113-15. 1 recognize that the precedential value
of Pico is uncertain. However, the plurality's rationale is particularly persuasive within the
context of art funding. The discussion of Pico plurality's rationale is provided not as black letter
law, but as another way of considering the use of censorial community values.
106 Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (footnote omitted).
1071d at 872.
108 Id at 872 (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). The
concern for a school board prescribing what is orthodox reading material in the school library is
analogous to concern for a government actor prescribing what is orthodox in the context of art
finding or access. If a government actor removes finding from or access to art, the government
will limit the type of art the public can view.
109 See id at 857.
110 See Cuban Museum of Arts v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121, 1125-27 (S.D. Fla.
1991); see also supra Part II.C.1.
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speech for its offensiveness to the community's values.1 II
According to the Pico plurality therefore, at least in the context of school
libraries, the use of censorial community values is unconstitutional. That is to say,
because Pico states that the school board's action is unconstitutional if the
motivation for that action is the desire to deny information to children, the use of
censorial community values is unconstitutional because it encompasses the desire
of an official to deny information because of that information's offensiveness.
This analysis can be applied to the context of art funding and access because the
desire of an official in withdrawing such access based on community values is the
desire to deny access to information; thus, the use of censorial community values
in the arts context is also unconstitutional.
D. The Rule for Censorial Community Values
This section will discuss a rule for finding the use of censorial community
values unconstitutional and will provide courts with a test to recognize the use of
censorial community values.
1. The Unconstitutionality of Censorial Community Values
By reading Finley, Rosenberger, and Pico in conjunction, one can see that a
government actor's use of censorial community values is unconstitutional when
used to withdraw funding from, or access to, art immediately after the community
is offended or in refusing to grant renewal funding later.112 This section will
I11 In Pico, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the school board did indeed
remove the books because of the board's animosity toward the books' message. Pico, 457 U.S.
at 872-75. Instead, the Court determined that the evidence raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the board was motivated by the desire to deny access to the books and stated
summary judgment could not be found in favor of the school board. Id at 872.112 Some may argue that finding a government entity's use of censorial community values
unconstitutional will have an adverse effect on art funding and encourage governments to
withhold funding altogether to avoid funding art that will offend a community's values. In fact;
the government posed a similar argument in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
390 (1984). In League of Women Voters, the government argued Congress would retaliate
against editorial comments made on several noncommercial television and radio stations by
withdrawing federal funds from all broadcasting stations. Id at 390. ("An underlying
supposition of the Government's argument in this regard is that individual noncommercial
stations are likely to speak so forcefully on particular issues that Congress, the ultimate source
of the stations' federal funding, will be tempted to retaliate against these individual stations by
restricting appropriations for all of public broadcasting."). The Court was not persuaded by this
argument because realistically the Court could not see Congress punishing all broadcasting
stations for the distinctive messages of several particular broadcasting stations. Id at 391. The
risk that government entities will withhold funding from all art museums in response to
disagreement with several pieces of art seems equally unlikely. Because government entities
have a history of funding art, it seems unlikely that government entities will cease to fund art
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address the unconstitutionality of using censorial community values in two
contexts: a government entity's immediate withdrawal of funding for art and a
government entity's later refusal to renew funding for art.
a. Immediate Withdrawal ofFunding or Access to Art
While Finley does allow the National Endowment for the Arts to consider
community values in granting funding through a statutory mandate, it also states
that government may not act to suppress ideas simply because the government
disagrees with those ideas.113 The use of censorial community values is the
"'manipulat[ion]' [of a subsidy] to have a 'coercive effect .... , 114 When a
government official attempts to use funding or a subsidy to coerce a museum into
withdrawing an exhibit because the exhibit offends the community's values, the
government official acts against the dicta in Finley.
In addition, under the Finley dicta, a government entity that is entitled to
consider community values in awarding funds may not use its power to penalize
disfavored viewpoints. 115 The withdrawal of funds or access to art through the
application of censorial community values is indeed a penalty against a
disfavored viewpoint. Through the use of censorial community values, a
government entity punishes art; a museum, or an artist by withdrawing money or
access to art because the government entity believes the art conflicts with the
community's values. Thus, the use of censorial community values is
unconstitutional under the dicta in Finley because a government entity uses
censorial community values to coerce or penalize a museum or artist because of
the viewpoint expressed in the art.
The Finley court stated that the government, through the National
Endowment for the Arts, does not indiscriminately grant funding to encourage a
diversity of views because of the competitive nature of the NEA funding
process.1 16 However, it can be argued that within other parts of the arts funding
context, the government does spend money to encourage a diversity of views. For
example, in Broolyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, the city never attempted to
simply to prevent several pieces of offensive art from being exhibited. See Michael Wingfield
Walker, Artistic Freedom v. Censorship: The Aftermath of the NEA's New Funding
Restrictions, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 937, 938-40 (1993) (providing a brief history of the
government funding of art).
113 See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (citing Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,550 (1983)).
114 Id (citing Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,237 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
1151d
116 Id at 586.
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condition the funds on its prior approval of the art exhibits. 117 Furthermore, the
city's provision of funds is hardly as competitive as the NEA's grant-making
process. Thus, in some contexts, a government entity indeed does award funds to
encourage a diversity of views. If a government entity does encourage a diversity
of views, it may not enforce viewpoint-based restrictions.118
The use of censorial community values in the context of arts funding when
the government seeks to encourage a diversity of views is unconstitutional under
Rosenberger. As discussed in Part II.B, the use of censorial community values is
viewpoint discrimination. That is to say, the withdrawal of art funding because
the community disapproves of the art and the message relayed in the art is
viewpoint discrimination. 119 The use of censorial community values proves that
the community dislikes, or that a government entity fears that the community will
dislike, the viewpoint expressed in the art. The subsequent withdrawal of funding
because of this dislike or potential dislike is discrimination based on viewpoint. If
a government entity discriminates on the basis of viewpoint while at the same
time encouraging a diversity of views, the government entity's action is
unconstitutional according to Rosenberger.
Finally, the use of censorial community values is unconstitutional under the
rationale set forth by the Pico plurality decision.120 pico states that a government
entity cannot act to withhold speech if the government entity is motivated by a
117 Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189-
190 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
118 See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
119 Perhaps one could even characterize this withdrawal of funding as a "negative
subsidy." See Redish & Kessler, supra note 20, at 558. Redish and Kessler state:
A negative subsidy conditions receipt on a potential speaker's decision either to refuse to speak
or to cease speaking.... Under our structure, negative subsidies are presumptively
unconstitutional. The structure finds them constitutional only in those cases in which current
First Amendment jurisprudence would uphold an affirmative imposition of a burden, such as
when the government imposes a fine or prison sentence for expression falling outside the scope
of the First Amendment....
Id at 557.
Under this analysis, the withdrawal of funding is an unconstitutional negative subsidy
because the government entity conditions the subsidy on the artist's or museum's decision to
cease speaking by withdrawing the art. That is to say, when a government entity withdraws
funding from art through the use of censorial community values, the museum must stop
exhibiting the offensive art to receive the funding again. Thus, the government entity negatively
subsidizes art because in order to receive the funding, the museum or artist must forego their
constitutional right to expression.
120 Once again, the author recognizes that the plurality decision is not to be given full
precedential value. See supra note 105. However, when taken in conjunction with the Finley
and Rosenberger decisions, the Pico plurality's rationale supplements the argument that the use
of censorial community values is viewpoint discrimination.
1746 [Vol. 61:1725
CENSORIAL COMMUNY VALUES
desire to deny access to speech because of disagreement with the speech.121
When a government entity acts to withhold funding from art, it is, in effect
attempting to withhold access to that art altogether.122 If the art cannot be shown
in a museum because a government entity evicts the museum, 123 the government
entity removes the art speech from the community and "prescribe[s] what shall be
orthodox in... matters of opinion."'124 Furthermore, if the government entity uses
censorial community values to justify its withdrawal of funds, it acts out of
disagreement with the art. Offense to the community's values is basically the
same as disagreement with the art. Thus, if the government entity retaliates
against art by withdrawing funding or access, it does so out of disagreement with
that art and thereby violates the rule set forth in the Pico plurality decision.
b. Later Refusal to Renew Funding
A government actor's later refusal to renew funding125 based on offense to
the community's values is unconstitutional for the same reasons.126 However, this
121 Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982).
122 See Redish & Kessler, supra note 20, at 553 (stating that in considering "[w]hen
government ties subsidies to expression," the major inquiry is whether the government's refusal
to subsidize actually penalizes protected expression). "One easily could conceive a government
subsidy so central to an individual's well being that the denial of it will, as a practical matter,
have at least as much adverse impact as would a fine or prison sentence." Id at 554 (footnote
omitted). The withdrawal of funding from art could have the same impact as a fine because this
withdrawal takes money away from the artist or museum and forces them to look elsewhere,
expending valuable time, in order to display the art.
123 Cuban Museum of Arts v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121, 1125-27 (S.D. Fla.
1991).
124 Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
125 For example, in the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences case, the museum's
contract with the City of New York provides that '[the City] shall pay to the [Institute] each
year such sum as may be necessary for the maintenance of said Museum Building, or as may be
authorized by law or be apportioned or appropriated by [the City].' Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and
Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). In the future, if the
city decides to provide the museum with less funding than it has provided in the past based on
its disapproval of the Sensation Exhibit, one could argue the city used censorial community
values to discriminate based on viewpoint For a discussion of this case and the Sensation
Exhibit, see supra Part II.C.2.12 6 This author is not arguing that refusal to renew art funding always constitutes
viewpoint discrimination and is unconstitutional. This author recognizes that often government
actors need to curtail art funding for financial, administrative, and other reasons that do not
represent viewpoint discrimination. However, when a government actor uses censorial
community values in refusing to renew funding the failure to renew funding is viewpoint
discrimination. Of course, finding viewpoint discrimination in the context of failure to renew
funding may be difficult to prove. However, if an art museum or artist can indeed prove the
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is certainly a more difficult issue because of the holding in Rust allowing the
government to selectively fund activities.127 Critics could analogize a decision to
renew funding to the initial decision to grant funding in which the government is
afforded discretion to choose what it desires to fund.
However, several problems would be present in a government's failure to
renew funding by using censorial community values. First, Rosenberger
specifically distinguished Rust's approval of government discretion when the
government is the speaker128 from a situation in which the government seeks to
encourage diversity of views. Thus, when the government is not the speaker "but
expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers," the
government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint129 Unless a city
specifically sets out to fund a certain exhibit of the museum or a museum that has
a particular purpose such as African-American history, the city cannot be a
speaker in the arts funding context. Because the city is not the speaker, Rust
would not apply and the city would not be able to dictate the art exhibited by a
museum by refusing to renew funding. The city's action would be outside the rule
set forth in Rosenberger because by refusing to renew funding for an art museum,
the city would be discriminating on the basis of viewpoint while at the same time
encouraging diversity of viewpoint.
Second, government funding of art is not a new phenomenon. 130 It would be
difficult to conclude viewpoint discrimination did not exist if a city refused to
renew Iraditional art funding after the city used censorial community values to
justify an attempt to withdraw funding. If the use of censorial community values
is viewpoint discrimination when withdrawing art funding, it follows that the use
government actor used censorial community values to refuse to renew funding, this viewpoint
discrimination should not go unpunished simply because normally it is difficult to prove or
because a government actor is usually given more discretion in choosing to grant funding as
opposed to withdrawing funding.
127 For a discussion of the facts and holding of Rust, see supra note 34. Rust held that it is
not unconstitutional for the government to "selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities ...... 500 U.S. at 193. The Rust Court stated, "'A refusal to fund protected activity,
without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity."' Id (citing
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,317 n.19 (1980)). Thus, the example of funding renewal could
appear to fall within the Rust analysis and allow the government to fund a museum with less
money.
128 See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
[I]n Rust v. Sullivan ... [w]e recognized that when the government appropriates public
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.... When the
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted
by the grantee.
Id.
129 Id. at 834.
130 See Walker, supra note 112, at 938-40 (discussing government art funding).
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of censorial community values should be viewpoint discrimination when refusing
to renew art funding, especially if the city had a long tradition of funding a
particular museum. 131
The previous use of censorial community values would seem to be evidence
of the presence of censorial community values in the funding renewal context. 132
In fact, this type of government behavior could be classified as a penalty or an
unconstitutional condition because the government would be punishing the
museum for showing the disapproved art by not renewing funding and stating that
the museum could not receive funding if it exhibited offensive art. The Supreme
Court has held: "[]f the government could deny a benefit to a person because of
his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' ' 133
Third, the government could have even more trouble refusing to renew the art
funding if the funding contract is similar to the one between the Brooklyn
Institute of Arts and Sciences and the City of New York. This contract provides
that the city funding be used only for maintenance. 134 Hence, the likelihood that
the city is actually the speaker under the Rosenberger analysis is minimal or
nonexistent because the city is only funding maintenance, not art.
Of course, difficulty may lie in proving the government actor refused a
131 For example, the Brooklyn Museum of Arts and Sciences has been funded for a long
time by the City of New York. See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, 64
F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Therefore, a refusal to renew funding, following an
attempt to withdraw funding due to offense to the community, could be perceived as a result of
the use of censorial community values.
As long as Mayor Giuliani is in office, its seems as though the Brooklyn Museum of Arts
and Sciences is not in danger of a refusal to renew funding. See Feuer, supra note 59. The
settlement agreement between the museum and the city precluded the mayor from reducing the
museum's funding "by any amount 'disproportionately greater' than that of seven other New
York museums." Id. ("The agreement is binding until [Mayor Giuliani] leaves office.").
132 One author argued, "The decisionmaker's past behavior, however, usually justifies the
court's strong suspicion of his motives and its concomitant scrutiny of the merits of a new
decision and requirement of prophylactic measures." Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95, 127
(1971) (footnotes omitted). Thus, difficulty in proving a government entity used censorial
community values to refuse funding for art could be alleviated by proof of the government
entity's previous reaction to the art and immediate attempt to withdraw funding.
13 3 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 526 (1958)). For a discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see generally
Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413 (1989).
13 4 Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 184. The contract defines
maintenance activities as: "(1) repairs and alterations; (2) fuel; (3) waste removal; (4) wages of
employees providing essential maintenance, custodial, security and other basic services; (5)




renewal of funding through the use of censorial community values.135 A
government actor could plausibly argue the refusal was based on a lack of
funding or for some other administrative or financial reason.136 An art museum or
artist could have quite a large amount of difficulty proving refusal to renew
funding was based upon censorial community values. However, during litigation
over this question, courts could adopt the test proposed in Part m11.D.2 and ask
whether offense to community values was the blatant or pretextual basis for the
refusal.137
2. The Testfor Determining Whether a Government Entity Used Censorial
Community Values to Withdraw Fundingfrom or Access to Art
Because the use of censorial community values is unconstitutional as
viewpoint discrimination, it is essential for courts to recognize when a
government entity uses censorial community values to justify the withdrawal of
funds from or access to art. This author has developed a three-step test that courts
can use to determine whether a government entity has acted unconstitutionality by
using censorial community values.138
135 Typical difficulty in proving the use of censorial community values should not
foreclose the ability to recover if the use of censorial community values actually can be proved
in a certain case. See Brest, supra note 132, at 120 ("It is often impossible to establish that a
decisionmaker entertained an illicit or suspect objective. But this does not justify a blanket
refusal to undertake the inquiry if a decisionmaker's motivation can sometimes be determined
with adequate certainty.").
136 Brest actually argued that a government entity's unconstitutional purpose could be
inferred from a specific time frame of events. Id at 122 ("The following chronological
sequence, for example, is typical of a variety of cases: the decisionmaker enforces a
discriminatory operative rule; a court enjoins this practice; the decisionmaker then adopts a
constitutionally 'innocent' rule that effectively maintains the status quo ante."). In comparison,
this author would argue that a government entity's attempt to withhold art funding due to
offense to community values, lack of success at censoring the art, and later refusal to renew
funding is a similar time frame of events that should prove a government entity's
unconstitutional use of censorial community values. Brest stated, 'The decisionmaker's past
behavior, however, usually justifies the court's strong suspicion of his motives and its
concomitant scrutiny of the merits of a new decision and requirement of prophylactic
measures." Id at 127 (footnotes omitted). Thus, difficulty in proving a government entity used
censorial community values to refuse funding for art could be alleviated by proof of the
government entity's previous reaction to the art and immediate attempt to withdraw funding.13 7 See supra Part III.D.2.
138 One author argued that, in the arts context, the government should be required to meet
the same strict scrutiny test used in analyzing government interference with political speech.
Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 102 (1996).
Art is a countervailing force. Because of its threat to the status quo, the government has an
almost irresistible urge to meddle with it. Whether the government is funding, distributing, or
suppressing artworks, there should be a presumption that such meddling is unconstitutional. The
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First, the court must ask whether the withdrawal of funds or access to art
occurred after a government entity granted such funding or access. This part of
the test deals with the component of the definition of censorial requiring the
banning to occur after examination. 139 This is a rather simple inquiry and requires
only cognizance of the time frame in which the incident occurred. If the answer to
this inquiry is in the negative, the censorial community values analysis ends. The
analysis ends because I have specifically limited the definition of censorial
community values in this note to those community values used to censor art that
the government already funded. As the discussion in Part ll.B illustrates, the use
of censorial community values to withdraw funds after a government entity
granted such funding is a good indicator that the government entity engaged in
viewpoint discrimination. If the court answers this question affirmatively, the
court must move on to the second prong.
Second, the court must consider whether the government entity blatantly used
community values to justify the withdrawal of funds or access.140 Basically, this
inquiry requires the court to determine whether the government entity specifically
stated that its purpose in withdrawing funding or access to art was to forego
offense to the community's values. If the answer to this inquiry is no, the court
must move on to the third prong. If the answer to this question is in the
affirmative, the government entity used censorial community values
unconstitutionally to justify the withdrawal of funds. For example, in Brooklyn
Institute ofArts and Sciences, Mayor Giuliani stated, "You don't have a right to a
government subsidy to desecrate someone else's religion.' 141 Furthermore, the
ejectment action filed by the city specifically alleged that the art would offend the
community.' 42 Hence, in this case, the mayor and city blatantly used censorial
government can overcome this presumption only if its regulation passes the strict scrutiny now
applied to political speech.
Id
139 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
140 The second prong of the test basically asks whether the government actor blatantly
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint This type of analysis follows Rosenberger because the
Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied the religious group's request for
newspaper funding because the group "was a 'religious activity' within the meaning of the
Guidelines, i.e., that the newspaper 'promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about
a deity or an ultimate reality."' Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 827
(1995). The government actor in Rosenberger thus blatantly discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint because the justification for the discriminatory denial of funds was specifically the
viewpoint expressed by the newspaper. See id The Court stated, "Having offered to pay the
third-party contractors on behalf of private speakers who convey their own messages, the
University may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints." d at 835.
141 Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).
142 Id at 192. The city claimed it filed an action for ejectment because the museum
violated its lease, contract, and enabling legislation by:
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community values to justify the withdrawal of art funding from the museum.
Because both the mayor and the ejectment action stated that the reason for the
city's action was potential offense to the community, the attempt to withhold
funding was in retaliation to the potential offense that community would feel
upon seeing the exhibit.
Another example of the blatant use of censorial community values to justify
the withdrawal of access to art is discussed in Part III.C.3. While the director of
the Detroit Institute of Arts is not a government actor, he blatantly used censorial
community values to justify canceling the exhibit1 43 The director issued a press
release postponing the exhibit because he feared "it would 'cause offense to
important parts of our community."' 144 Thus, the director of the Detroit Institute
of Arts overtly stated his purpose in canceling the exhibit, after showing it for two
days,145 was to avoid offense to the community. Therefore, he blatantly used
censorial community values to justify withdrawing access to the art.
Finally, the court must ask whether the entity's stated justifications were only
a pretext146 for the concern for community values.147 This part of the test looks
(1) imposing a $9.75 admission charge for the Exhibit without the Mayor's approval; (2)
violating the Museum's obligation to "educate and enlighten school children and the public"
and to serve a public purpose, in that the Museum intended to proceed with the Exhibit which
the City contend[ed] contain[ed] inappropriate, "sensational" matter that is "offensive to
significant segments of the public;" and (3) improperly furthering "the commercial interests of
private parties," rather than public purposes, because the works in the Exhibit c[a]me from the
private collection of Charles Saatchi, who is a client of Christie's, the auction house, which also
gave financial support to the Exhibit
Id (emphasis added). Thus, in addition to the mayor's comments specifically stating the exhibit
offended the community's religious values, the city based its ejectment action on the
offensiveness of the art to the community. Id
143 See supra note 50 for a description of the exhibit
144 Duin, supra note 65, at A7.
145 Meredith, supra note 63, at 10.
146 This type of analysis is common to First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 45, 54 (1986), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance when applied to two adult film theaters. The Court
stated, "Renton has not used 'the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression ...'
Id at 54 (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). The implication of this statement, therefore, is that if the city had used its zoning
powers as a pretext to suppressing the theaters' First Amendment speech rights, the Court
would have found the city's action unconstitutional. See also Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S.
697,707 n.4 (1986) ("Respondents assert that closure of their premises is sought as a pretext for
suppression of First Amendment protected expression.... Were respondents able to establish
the existence of such a speech suppressive motivation or policy.., they might have a claim of
selective prosecution."); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
797 (1985) ("We express no opinion on the question whether petitioner's explanation is merely
a pretext for viewpoint discrimination.').
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behind the government entity's stated purpose for withdrawing funding to see if
the entity's real purpose was retaliation against the art for actual or potential
offense to the community's values. If the answer is yes, the government entity
used censorial community values to justify its withdrawal of funding. For
example, in Cuban Museum ofArts, the court found that the city's real purpose in
attempting to evict the museum was the avoidance of controversy 148 and offense
to the members of the community that disapproved of the art.149 While the city
In fact, the trial court in Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences applied this type of
rationale to find that New York City used alleged lease violations as a pretext for viewpoint
discrimination. The court stated, "the [Cuban Museum of Arts and Culture] Court found that
the exhibition was fully protected by the First Amendment, ... and that the claimed lease
violations were pretextual ... The same is true here." 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 200 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
147 Some may disagree with the suggestion that a court look to a government entity's
purpose or motivation for an act. For a discussion of the reasons courts should invalidate illicitly
motivated government laws, see Brest, supra note 132, at 116-18. Brest set forth several
reasons for courts to look into a government entity's decision to withdraw art funding. First,
governments are constitutionally prohibited from doing certain acts and should therefore be
precluded from such acts even when and unconstitutional motivation cannot be detected. Id. at
116. Second, a government entity's consideration of an illicit objective may determine the
outcome of a decision. Id Third, a person has a legitimate complaint if a government entity
made a decision based on an illicit objective. Id Finally, Brest stated that courts should
invalidate a government decision if the court can determine the government entity considered
an illicit objective. Id at 117 ("Evidence sufficient to establish that the decisionmaker gave any
weight to an illicit objective will also often establish that the decision would not have been
made but for the pursuit of that objective.").
148 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of this controversy.
149 Cuban Museum of Arts v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121, 1127 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
("More importantly, however, the court notes that the Commission never exhibited any real
concern over possible self-dealing and auction profits in connection with directors other than
those who had been linked with the controversial art."). The court stated:
The conduct of the City Commission with respect to the asserted grounds for the denial of
continued possession reveals that the reasons asserted were either minor concerns or a pretextual
basis upon which to remove the Cuban Museum and its present directors. The reason behind the
City's decision was the controversial and highly unpopular views that the plaintiffs had
advanced.
Id Because the city disapproved of the controversy and the community's response to the art, the
city tried to evict the museum under the pretextual allegation of a lease violation.
In interpreting and applying the Cuban Museum of Arts case to the Brooklyn Institute of
Arts and Sciences case the court stated, "The Court found that the exhibition was fully protected
by the First Amendment, that the absence of a 'right' to renewal [of the lease] did not defeat the
First Amendment claim, and that the claimed lease violations were pretextual." Brooklyn Inst.
of Arts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 200. Thus, the Brooklyn Institute ofArts and Sciences
court interpreted the Cuban Museum of Arts decision as based on Miami's pretextual reasons
for evicting the museum. Miami's alleged concerns over self-dealing and the auction were only
a pretext for the concern for the community's values.
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alleged it wanted to evict the museum for reasons such as concern over an
admission charge and failure to comply with insurance requirements, 150 the court
found the real purpose for the city's eviction attempt was "the controversial and
highly unpopular views that the plaintiffs had advanced. ' 151 Thus, the city's
justifications for evicting the museum and thereby withdrawing access and
funding from art were only a pretext for the offense caused to the community's
values. If the court answers this question in the negative, the government entity's
actions do not constitute a use of censorial community values at least in the
context of a withdrawal of funding for or access to art.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the use of censorial community values to withdraw funding or
access to art is unconstitutional as viewpoint discrimination. The use of censorial
community values allows a government actor to ban art that is perceived as
offensive to the community. It requires the government actor to look specifically
at the viewpoint expressed in the art to determine whether to withdraw the art's
funding. The test proposed in Part Im.D.2 allows courts to recognize and
determine when a government actor used censorial community values and should
therefore be used to find censorial community values unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.
150 Cuban Museum ofArts, 766 F. Supp. at 1127.1511Id
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